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In pensions, the practice of valuation purports to answer the question of whether a 
pension fund has sufficient assets to honor its promises. Uncertainty about the answer is 
converted into calculable risk, using the insights of financial economics. This paper 
examines why UK pension funds have ‘derisked’ their portfolios by moving out of assets 
with volatile prices. It is shown that derisking is produced by the performance of 
financialized risk management in a regulatory setting where horizons are shortened. 
While derisking is not generally in the interests of employers or scheme members, and is 
damaging to the wider economy, three features of the governance structure have stymied 
attempts to counteract it. These are: the spillover effects of financialization in corporate 
accounting, herding around industry benchmarks, and collective action problems arising 
from the regulator’s dependence on dialogue with private actors and from the risk-
aversion of political actors.  
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greatly enhanced my understanding of how pension scheme valuation works in the UK. 
All remaining errors and contentious interpretations are my own responsibility. 
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Reckless prudence: Financialization in UK pension scheme governance  




One of the challenges in researching financialization is to grasp the multiple channels 
through which finance shapes contemporary political economy. One crucial channel is 
that financialized ways of seeing, measuring and calculating have come to pervade 
economic life, as financial markets have grown and their modes of operation and 
calculation have evolved (Froud et al 2006). Research on the performativity of economics 
has proved particularly fruitful in understanding how financial markets work (MacKenzie 
2008). But this thriving research program in economic sociology is not often linked to 
political economy (Braun 2016). This paper seeks to develop the links by focusing on the 
interface between market conduct and public policy, where regulation takes place.  
 
Among the issues that public financial regulators face, there is one overarching dilemma: 
how to promote financial risk-taking to achieve a dynamic and productive economy while 
protecting public resources from depletion, potentially on a very large scale. As the 
failures of banks and other financial institutions in the Great Financial Crisis unfolded, it 
became inescapable to recognize that financial markets create substantial contingent 
liabilities for governments. Public authorities have responded by trying to make their 
unruly partners ‘safer’. Post-crisis, safety-oriented regulation has contributed to an 
increase in the risk premium and an attenuated period of exceptionally low returns on 
safe assets. High demand for safe assets has reduced the effectiveness of quantitative 
easing (QE), in turn reducing the efficacy of monetary policy and contributing to 
macroeconomic stagnation (PCWG 2014, Part 1; Caballero et al 2017). 
 
This paper demonstrates how both market actors and regulators understand ‘safety’ in a 
financialized way, and draws out the implications. It is argued that the financialized quest 
for safety can produce outcomes which are not in the interests of the participating parties 
nor really particularly safe from the perspective of public policy. This argument is 
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developed through a close analysis  of pension fund valuation in the UK. Pension 
provision is a leading case for studying the interaction of public policy with financial 
markets. Financial interests promoted pension privatization, promising governments a 
way out of a pressing public policy problem (Engelen 2003). But private pensions created 
public policy problems of their own, as governments were drawn into bailing out 
schemes which had defaulted on their promises. This engendered tighter regulation in an 
effort to make schemes safer, and this has had perverse effects. 
 
The focus of safety-oriented pension regulation is the process of valuation, which aims to 
establish whether a pension scheme has sufficient funds to meet its promises. The 
valuation of a pension scheme is financialized in the sense defined by Chiapello (2015, 
p.17): it is a process ‘equipped by models, instruments, and representations belonging to 
the explicit knowledge underpinning the approach and practices of finance professionals.’ 
All three of the financialized approaches to valuation identified by Chiapello are found in 
pension valuation: discounting is used to turn the future flow of pension payments into a 
present value for liabilities, assets are valued at market prices, and the risk that assets will 
be insufficient to meet liabilities in the future is estimated probabilistically. These 
techniques allow the uncertain future of pension obligations and fund performance to be 
reduced to a snapshot in which available information about the future is efficiently 
compressed into the present.  
 
It is a striking achievement to render an uncertain future calculable in this way. 
Inevitably, calculations have to be updated in the light of unforeseen events. These may 
force expectations to be revised radically, as the financial crisis and the coronavirus 
pandemic have made clear. But the inevitability of error in forecasting is not the concern 
of the present discussion. Rather, this paper focuses on how valuation as a technique for 
forecasting affects decisions made now. Using the case of the UK to illustrate the 
processes at work, the argument is that valuation has contributed to the investment 
strategy of ‘derisking’, whereby occupational pension funds move out of equities and into 
bonds. This has consigned them to earning lower returns on investment, raising the cost 
of schemes and contributing to their closure. One paradoxical consequence is that many 
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households now do not have access to collective schemes which could pool risks and 
mitigate individual exposure. Derisking of collective schemes has turned out to mean 
more risk for households, which experience financialization as an individualization of 
responsibility for their future income security (Langley 2006). 
 
Critics of an overly cautious approach to managing assets – termed ‘reckless prudence’ in 
the industry1 - include public actors who might be expected to be influential: even, at one 
point, the Pensions Regulator, TPR (O’Higgins 2012). The consequences of derisking are 
bemoaned by influential commentators, notably at the Bank of England, who advocate 
that occupational pension funds should be patient risk-taking investors, weathering the 
storms of market volatility (Haldane 2014). Major reviews of institutional investment by 
Myners (2001) and Kay (2012b) have contributed to regulatory reforms intended to 
promote patient investment, yet the trajectory of derisking shows no signs of reversal.  
 
The remarkable fact is that derisking occurs despite being an outcome that no interested 
party actively desires. Derisking is not in the interests of plan participants; nor do pension 
fund managers or other financial intermediaries receive obvious benefits, even though 
they often seem to be driving the process. As summarized by Kay (2012a, p.22), ‘a 
substantial reduction in the commitment of UK pension funds to both UK and overseas 
equities.. benefitted no one: not pensioners, not the interests of companies which made 
pension provision, nor the UK economy.’ The regulator might be seen as the actor whose 
interests prevail, with political pressure to avoid scheme failures making regulation 
highly risk-averse. Certainly, there is plenty of commentary that blames public regulation 
for destroying the UK’s defined benefit occupational pensions (see e.g. Ellison 2018). 
But the following discussion shows that, while the regulator plays a key role, it does not 
act alone. The financial actors who serve as intermediaries in running pension funds – 
actuaries, consultants and investment managers – engage in a regulatory dialogue to 
which they bring ideational resources and expertise as well as preferences (Black 2008). 
The valuation process is the joint product of this public-private interaction.  
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This paper identifies three features of the valuation process which have combined to 
produce the perverse outcome of derisking. First, it is argued that specific expertise on 
pension scheme viability, cultivated by actuaries, has been displaced by the more generic 
insights of financial economics. This displacement has occurred partly because of 
spillover from the cognate privately-regulated area of corporate accounting. But it has 
also occurred because both private and public actors embrace the promise of financial  
economics to make the soundness of a pension scheme objectively ‘computable’ by 
converting incalculable uncertainty into calculable risk (Nelson and Katzenstein 2014; 
Esposito 2018, p.223). The key move in this calculation is to equate the riskiness of an 
asset with the volatility of its market price. Second, public-private interaction in 
regulation produces herding, due to the regulator’s reliance on industry norms and 
benchmarks. The available market information leaves space for judgment, but this space 
is closed down by treating average judgments as a privileged form of information, almost 
as if they themselves are products of a market process. Third, attempts to reform 
valuation have failed because of collective action problems. Public policy-makers might 
be expected to surmount collective action problems, but this is stymied by the regulator’s 
dependence on dialogue with private actors and by the risk-aversion of political actors.  
 
Braun (2016) has argued that attention to the performativity of financial economic 
theories is an essential part of the research agenda of opening the black box of financial 
market practices. The next section introduces this argument, along with the 
complementary view that the practices of the industry should be understood as arising 
from a social process driven by the need for coordinating conventions (Nelson and 
Katzenstein 2014). It is argued that we should think of regulators as active participants in 
this process of market construction and coordination. But they operate inside, not above, 
the process, which is why this mode of public policy-making can be vulnerable to herding 
and fail to resolve collective action problems. In response, critics have proposed more 
democratization of regulation, but their case relies on an interest-based account of 
regulatory capture rather than grasping how public actors, both regulatory and political, 
can be constrained and steered by accepted theories.  
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Derisking is the result of a set of practices around pension fund valuation, which in turn 
affect asset management. Section three presents evidence on derisking in the UK and 
compares the UK with other countries.. Section four demonstrates how valuation 
practices apply financial economic theory, and introduces the critical assessments 
advanced by the Bank of England and others. Section five presents a case study of a 
sustained campaign to modify valuation outcomes in response to the effect of quantitative 
easing on interest rates, and examines why the government apparently preferred not to 
intervene. The final section concludes with some thoughts on what is to be done: 
specifically, whether finance can be steered towards serving public purposes through 
more democratization and politicization of regulation. 
 
 
2. The role of theories in financial regulation and practice 
 
There is now a burgeoning literature which grapples with the problem of explaining and 
interpreting the institutions of financial markets: the ways that financial instruments are 
constructed, valued and traded. The role of theories in shaping the operation of markets 
finds strong expression in the concept of performativity (MacKenzie 2008), while others 
argue that socially and culturally-founded conventions guide behavior  (Nelson and 
Katzenstein 2014). This section provides a selective review of this literature and draws 
out the implications for understanding regulation, meaning in this context the 
establishment of rules and practices of market conduct by authoritative public agencies or 
private associations.  
 
The performativity approach seeks to understand how economic theories affect the 
operation and regulation of markets. Its key insight is that ‘the economy is embedded in 
economics’ (Braun 2016, p.258). Economic ideas do not ‘act on’ the economy; rather, 
economic ideas are performed through the operation of markets. Instead of criticising 
economics for its unreality (in particular, its thin characterization of humans as rational 
actors), we should appreciate how economics is a program for constituting markets, 
determining how participants understand those markets, and thereby profoundly 
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influencing material outcomes. Thus the capital asset pricing model is ‘performed’ in 
models used by financial intermediaries to price assets and engage in arbitrage 
(MacKenzie 2008), while the ‘efficient markets’ axiom that the market prices of assets 
are the best available estimate of future income flows guides passive investment 
strategies based on index construction and trading (Braun 2016). 
 
Contributions to the literature make more or less strong claims about the performativity 
of economics (MacKenzie 2008, p.17). A ‘weak’ claim is that participants in market 
processes use insights from economics; a stronger version is that the theory alters the 
world in a way which makes the theory more true. This also permits the possibility of 
counterperformativity, where the use of an economic model undermines its predictive 
power. MacKenzie does not embrace the notion, put forward by Callon, that 
performativity in economics cultivates the rational egoism of market participants; on the 
contrary, he finds that market actors engage in collective action to build institutions in the 
course of performing financial economic theory (2008, pp. 151-2). This opens up 
connections between performativity and regulation, as it suggests that actors can engage 
in deliberate design to achieve desired outcomes (MacKenzie 2008, p. 274).   
 
It is not generally possible to verify the predictions of a theory and thereby evaluate its 
‘truth’. In pension fund valuation, the correctness of the prediction (that a fund has 
sufficient resources to honor future claims, or not) cannot be verified for some time, so 
adherents replace truth with credibility or trust. Nelson and Katzenstein (2014) argue that 
financial techniques are embraced because of their credibility: specifically, their capacity 
to turn incalculable uncertainty into calculable risk. They demonstrate how practices such 
as the calculation of value-at-risk are useful to both market actors and regulators, despite 
being known to be flawed. They are silent on the theoretical origins of the calculation, 
which can be seen as a performance of financial economics. Instead, they emphasize how 
conventions ‘are adopted by pragmatic, intentional agents seeking steadier footing in the 
presence of epistemic uncertainty.’ (Nelson and Katzenstein 2014, p.362) This focus on 
conventions highlights how practices gain force by being used and becoming familiar. 
For Nelson and Katzenstein, conventions are ‘social’, and they serve their coordinative 
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function by becoming ‘common knowledge’. While the models used in finance are rooted 
in ‘some theory and historical evidence’, Nelson and Katzenstein (2014, p.363) propose 
that they have been rendered ‘tractable’ by social processes. Thus theory is not so much 
performed as absorbed. 
 
Reading McKenzie together with Nelson and Katzenstein, conventions appear modifiable 
but sticky and path dependent. Nölke’s (2010) analysis of private international standard-
setting by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) provides insights into 
the reasons why conventions might not be changed even when they are known to be 
dysfunctional. The IASB persisted with fair value accounting (valuing assets and 
liabilities at current market prices) in the face of evidence that it could be procyclical and 
heighten financial instability. In explaining its reluctance to vary the rules, the Board 
argued that ‘markets would be more confused by some sort of arbitrary measurement 
attribute’ (Nölke 2010,p.40). As Nölke puts it, the standard-setters ‘cherish the 
consistency of their models’ (2010, p.45). They rejected pressure to produce ‘regulatory 
numbers’ oriented towards public policy goals, fearing erosion of their own authority. 
While Nölke’s interpretation is that private international standard-setting was oriented 
towards the protection of investor interests and colored by the dominance of the Anglo-
American model of capitalism in the regulatory setup, his account also shows how a 
private regulatory body may be locked into the performance of a theory for reasons of 
reputation and credibility. It might be thought that a public regulator can escape this lock-
in because it has coercive authority. But public regulators also have reasons to be 
concerned about reputation and credibility. Their enforcement powers are often limited, 
cumbersome and subject to challenge in the courts, leading regulators to prefer persuasive 
techniques such as benchmarking and the promulgation of codes of practice.  
 
The following discussion identifies several reasons why pension fund valuation has been 
colonized by financialized techniques, drawing on Chiapello (2015). These include 
‘spillover’ from accounting practices: a process which helps us to appreciate how 
techniques can become pervasive, eliminating distinctive practices within a sub-sector. 
There are also ‘herding’ tendencies created by the regulator’s reliance on norms and 
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benchmarks to assess valuation practices, and tendency to reject claims that a sector or 
scheme is idiosyncratic. Both these processes can be found in Chiapello’s (2015) account 
of colonization. There is also a third process at work noted by Nölke, which is that the 
negotiated style of regulation creates a collective action problem in which the regulator is 
reluctant to change course or create exceptions for fear of damaging its authority. 
 
Black’s (2008) account of the ‘principles-led’ approach to regulation adopted in the UK 
gives some insight into how regulation becomes locked onto particular paths and 
practices. Principles-based regulation is a particular form of interaction between the 
regulator and the industry which delegates to regulatees the task of establishing 
appropriate internal controls to ensure that outcomes align with the regulator’s objectives 
or principles. The idea that this would mean a ‘light touch’ was promoted by some British 
public authorities as part of their program of regulatory competition in the financial sector 
(Black 2008, p.10). But the reality is more complex. Far from engendering risky behavior 
by the regulatee, those to whom discretion is delegated may take a precautionary 
approach due to uncertainty about what will be acceptable to the regulator (Black 2008, 
pp.28-29). Furthermore, uncertainty leads regulated firms to embrace guidance from a 
community of advisers and consultants which also tries to reduce uncertainty by acting as 
‘a force for convergence on a set of broadly common practices’ (Black 2008, p.28). As 
Nelson and Katzenstein (2014) emphasize, this convergence is founded in ‘common 
knowledge’ of basic principles of financial economics.  
 
There is a substantial body of criticism of financial regulation in the UK which 
emphasizes the regulator’s close and cooperative relationship with market actors (Johal et 
al 2014). Dorn (2015, p.23) notes that, in regulating the City of London, there were 
significant changes in methods: ‘from chubby chats to slide rules, then from slide rules to 
computerised models.. [but] this was not change from private to public.’ Dorn argues that 
‘knowledge remained private’ in international finance, and this explains why outcomes 
have been in the interests of finance, which takes excessive risks and then manages to 
privatize profits and socialize losses. For Johal et al (2014), the answer is to reduce the 
distance between regulation and democratic control. Dorn (2015) also argues for a 
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reassertion of democratic control: he takes aim particularly at the role of international 
private regulators, and argues for a return to the national level of politically-accountable 
regulation. Outcomes would then be more diverse, but, he argues, also more robust. 
 
The argument advanced here is not that private interests dominate over the public good in 
pensions regulation. Instead, it is proposed that the way valuations are conducted can be 
seen as a kind of public-private joint endeavor. Pension professionals and the regulator 
use the same models, and both contribute to their development and implementation. This 
means that, when we see perverse outcomes that are not in the public interest, we cannot 
immediately conclude that the interests of one party are prevailing over others, or that 
more political control would serve the public interest better. Rather, the challenge is to 
understand how dysfunctional practices have become established, and what kind of 
collective action is needed to change them. 
 
3. Derisking in UK defined benefit pension schemes 
In the UK, there has been a pronounced and steady trend since the early 2000s in the 
composition of pension fund investments, towards bonds and away from equities and 
other assets. The headline figures for defined benefit pensions covered by the Pension 
Protection Fund are that the share of portfolios allocated to equities fell from 61% in 
2006 to 27% in 2018, while the bond share rose from 28% to 59% (Pension Protection 
Fund 2018, p. 4.) An analysis for the Bank of England by Douglas and Roberts-Sklar 
(2018) found that the shift towards bonds was widespread over different employers and 
schemes, with only underfunded schemes backed by strong corporate sponsors bucking 
the trend.    
 
This section aims to locate the UK case within the wider landscape of pension fund 
governance. The UK has been distinctive in the extent to which funds have altered their 
asset allocations away from equities and towards bonds. A recent study by McCarthy et al 
(2016) highlights the very opposite trend in investment patterns in the US, the 
Netherlands and Finland. Between 1950 and 1980 (US), 1980 and 2000 (Netherlands), or 
still more recently (Finland), there was a pronounced shift out of bonds and towards 
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equities in all three countries. Using OECD data on similar kinds of schemes – 
‘traditional DB pensions’ – to update their findings suggests that the thrust of their 
analysis still holds. The bond share has risen in the US, but only slightly, from an average 
of 36% in 2000-07 to 40% in 2014-18, while in Finland it has fallen from 45% in 2004-
07 to 30% in 2014-18.2  More comprehensive data are available for the grand total of all 
pension schemes, including DC schemes. These show no sustained change in the risk 
profile of US schemes, a move out of bonds in Finland, and volatility in allocation in the 
Netherlands. 
 
This presents a puzzle: if derisking is a product of valuation practices, and if those 
practices are derived from financial economics, we should expect that countries that are 
integrated into the world of finance all demonstrate similar trends. Indeed, there is a 
widely-held view that, because financial economics dictates derisking, it will have, or is 
having, a negative effect on the sustainability of DB schemes across the developed world 
(Monk 2009). To explain these different national patterns and trajectories, we need to 
explain how some pension systems have been immunized against financial economics, or 
how they have translated the key insights differently. 
 
The study by McCarthy et al (2016) illustrates how a key idea of financial economics, 
which they term ‘modern portfolio theory’ (MPT), spread slowly and sporadically among 
countries with large funded pension schemes. The central idea of MPT was that fund 
managers could manage risk without sacrificing returns by holding a diversified portfolio 
of assets. This insight fell on stony ground in countries which maintained quantitative 
asset restrictions (QAR), which compelled fund managers to hold fixed proportions of 
assets deemed to be safe. But in countries which gave pension fund trustees discretion to 
choose their own prudent strategy – those governed by the Prudent Person Rule (PPR) – 
the insights of modern portfolio theory were quickly adopted (Horváthová et al 2017). 
Thus PPR was associated with investment allocations heavily weighted towards equities 
in the two early adopters, the US and the UK. The changes found by McCarthy et al for 
Finland and the Netherlands reflect the subsequent adoption of the PPR and 
accompanying dissemination of portfolio theory.  
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The valuation practices that have driven derisking in the UK are located within a PPR 
regime. To understand why other PPR systems have not shown the same tendencies, we 
need to find relevant differences in the determinants of investment strategy beyond the 
familiar PPR/QAR difference. Focusing on the relatively well-documented cases of the 
Netherlands, Finland and the USA, three differences emerge which are now discussed in 
turn. They are (1) the roles of employers and employee representatives in governance, 
relative to financial intermediaries; (2) the extent of risk-sharing with beneficiaries, and 
(3) other factors affecting public exposure to pension scheme losses, which are reflected 
in various regulatory rules to do with discount rates, smoothing and recovery periods.  
 
The roles of employers and employee representatives in governance, relative to financial 
intermediaries, is central to the extent of financialization that occurs. Analyses of 
investment strategy based on shareholder value maximization (SVM) often ignore the 
industrial relations of pension schemes, even though increases in employment costs will 
also impair shareholder value. This financialized world view came to be reflected in 
boardrooms, as new accounting standards changed the internal corporate politics of 
pensions. Once largely ignored by senior management and left to Human Resources 
departments to cultivate, the prospect of pensions having a substantial balance sheet 
impact led finance directors to take a close interest (Whiteside 2003). 
 
While schemes cross-nationally have experienced this change in the internal corporate 
politics of pensions, we can expect that industrial relations concerns bear more heavily in 
continental European pension systems where governing boards have balanced employer-
employee representation than in the Anglo-American model where employer-nominated 
trustees dominate. However, the expectation has been that member representation leads to 
more conservative investment allocations, whereas employers will favor riskier equity 
investment (Wiss 2015, p.135). McCarthy et al (2016: 761-3) argue that this pattern was 
not sustained in either the Netherlands or Finland because of contribution cost-sharing 
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between employers and employees. Unions in both countries saw higher returns through 
equity investment as preferable to contribution increases. 
 
McCarthy et al (2016) explain investment allocation by identifying the evolving 
preferences of unions and employers, particularly around shareholder activism. While 
aspects of fund management have been delegated to intermediaries, they cleave to the 
premise that ‘it is employers and employees who are ultimately responsible for making 
decisions about broad asset allocation’ (Gelepithis 2019 543). Gelepithis challenges this 
premise, arguing that ‘financial professionals involved in pension fund capitalism such as 
asset managers, actuaries, and pension consultants exert an independent influence over 
pension fund investment strategies’ (2019 545). The analysis presented in this article 
supports Gelepithis’s claim that derisking has been promoted by financial intermediaries, 
but this raises the question of why the risk-management models of intermediaries have 
gained more influence in the UK than in other comparable systems. Answering this 
question brings us to the two other sources of variation noted above: the extent of risk-
sharing between employer sponsors and the beneficiaries of pension promises, and the 
effect of public sector exposure on the regulatory framework. 
 
The idea of a ‘defined benefit’ appears to preclude the possibility that benefits may be 
adjusted in the light of investment returns, but DB systems often retain some scope to 
adjust benefits at the margins. Most striking is the Dutch case, where poor investment 
returns can lead to adjustment, not only of pension promises, but also of pensions in 
payment (Wiss 2019, pp.509-510). Discretion over the inflation-indexation of pension 
benefits is also found in the US, where underfunded schemes must scale back indexation. 
In the UK, trustees for many years retained some discretion over indexation and other 
improvements to benefits, but this was eliminated, at least at low rates of inflation, by 
successive Pensions Acts. In short, benefit promises are exceptionally well-protected 
from investment underperformance in the UK. This means that any shortfall in the assets 
of the fund relative to its liabilities (promised pensions) must be made up by the employer 
rather than by scaling back liabilities. Rapid repair will mean that the contributions that 
employers have to pay become volatile, and if this volatility is costly to the business, 
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employers will seek to reduce it by reducing the volatility of asset values, i.e. by 
derisking. 
 
There are some fundamental similarities in regulation across countries: the practices of 
discounting liabilities to get a present value and comparing that with marked-to-market 
asset values are pervasive. But systems differ in how much ‘smoothing’ regulators allow, 
and how they respond to underfunding. They can allow long recovery periods, or they 
can insist that any shortfall is repaired rapidly. Pension systems also differ in the rules 
governing overfunding; i.e. in the extent to which reserves can be accumulated to buffer 
the impact of volatile asset prices. In the UK, the employer owns the surplus and can take 
a contributions holiday (a practice which tax rules have, at times, required). Other 
systems allow surpluses to accumulate, which means that a scheme is less likely to be 
forced to derisk to guard against deficits. Without going into all the details, it is important 
to note that a funding regime can be seen as ‘strict’ in requiring a high level of funding, 
without this also dictating derisking. As the following sections explain, derisking is 
driven not by concerns about the level of funding, but about its volatility.   
 
In summary, the UK can be seen as an extreme case of financialized valuation in defined 
benefit pensions. The ideas about valuation discussed below are widely disseminated 
cross-nationally, but in each system they come up against countervailing ideas, carried 
into valuation governance by unions, employers, actuaries, regulators and governments. 
These countervailing ideas are widely known and discussed in the UK, but they are not 




4. Caution: Theory at work 
 
This section first provides a brief summary of how the ideas of present value, marking to 
market and probabilistic risk estimation come together in the periodic (triennial) process 
of conducting a DB pension scheme valuation in the UK. The discussion then backtracks 
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to the previous method of regulating valuations: the Minimum Funding Requirement 
(MFR) introduced in 1995. The effect of the MFR on investment allocation was widely 
recognized as dysfunctional, and the problems were summed up in a report by a leading 
City grandee, Paul Myners, in 2001. Myners’ recommendations informed the 2004 
Pension Act, which introduced the Scheme Specific Funding Requirement, which 
remains the basis of the system operating today. The recommendations were also 
translated into the ‘Myners Principles’ for institutional investment fund management. The 
widespread promulgation of these Principles creates the impression that Myners’ 
recommendations were adopted and implemented, yet on closer inspection it turns out 
that they have been eviscerated. A 2012 report on institutional investment (Kay 2012b) 
showed that essentially the same issues as identified in 2001 remained.  
 
The aim of a valuation is to establish whether the accumulated assets of a pension fund 
will be sufficient to meet its accumulated liabilities. These liabilities consist of a stream 
of pension payments, often far into the future. The standard practice is to discount those 
liabilities into a single figure - a ‘present value’ – which can then be compared with the 
accumulated assets. If assets are invested in ‘rewarded risk’ classes and ‘marked to 
market’, it is inevitable that the valuation outcome will be volatile. Conversely, ‘valuation 
risk’ can be reduced by matching the assets of the fund to the basis for the discount rate 
used to calculate liabilities. For example, if the discount rate is based on the interest rate 
on UK government bonds (‘gilts’), then investing assets in gilts ensures that a fall in that 
discount rate, which raises the present value of liabilities, will also raise the market value 
of matched assets.  
 
This process of matching to manage valuation risk is conventionally known as 
‘derisking’, although it does not actually make pensions more secure. As Merton (2014) 
highlights, conventional risk metrics focus on volatility in the value of the accumulated 
fund (asset focus) instead of looking at the risks to retirement income (income focus). 
The safest investment from an income viewpoint – a deferred inflation-protected annuity 
– may have a volatile price, but this asset price volatility does not present a risk to future 
pension income. Furthermore, since a so-called high risk investment strategy generates 
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more income than a low-risk strategy, the income lens reverses the asset lens on what is 
risky. The ‘derisked’ strategy is the one less likely to secure future pensions (Jacka and 
Hernandez 2019). 
 
Arguably, the traditional approaches of the actuarial profession implemented an income 
focus. However, they did so with techniques that came to appear old fashioned and 
unduly discretionary as financial economics took hold, such as ‘smoothing’ asset values 
rather than marking them to market. The victory of financial economics in UK pensions 
regulation partly reflected a loss of faith in actuarial judgment, triggered at least in part 
by the high-profile failure of the Equitable Life insurance company (Collins et al 2009). 
The ensuing crisis and reform of the actuarial profession contributed to the unification of 
professional approaches to pension fund valuation around the insights of financial 
economics. 
 
Trustees and employers are not compelled to engage in matching to manage valuation 
risk, but they can be forced into matching if they cannot demonstrate a capacity to bear 
that risk. The procedure followed by the regulator is to require schemes to estimate the 
range of future asset values (generated by probabilistic modeling) and check adverse 
outcomes against the employer covenant, a measure of the employer’s financial strength 
and backing of the fund. The logic is that the employer must be able to repair the fund if 
the risky strategy does not pay off. Trustees can choose to invest in high-return but 
volatile assets and, correspondingly, select a relatively high scheme specific discount 
rate, but it takes a strong employer covenant (or a scheme surplus) to do so (Deloitte 
2018). 
 
A lot rests on the assessment of the employer covenant. This assessment is the 
responsibility of the trustees of the scheme, and they can do it themselves – a so-called 
‘DIY assessment’. However, the regulator has discouraged this by questioning the 
trustees’ independence and expertise, and a small industry of covenant practitioners has 
emerged. While TPR does not conduct its own assessment of the covenant,  it can 
challenge the assessment put forward by the scheme actuary on the advice of the 
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covenant practitioner. This in turn encourages the practitioner to anticipate the basis of 
TPR’s view and incorporate this into its own work. Thus there is a kind of circular flow 
of modelling, knowledge and practice between the regulator and industry professionals.  
 
As Black (2008) argued, this circular flow is fuelled by a search for common standards, 
benchmarks and norms. This produces herding. There is trustee herding in investment 
strategies (PCWG 2014: 19-20), and the same is true of the selection of discount rates for 
the calculation of the present value of liabilities. Herding is facilitated by TPR, which 
publishes regular reports on the distribution of discount rates used in scheme valuations. 
The sector has long had a practice of using returns on gilts as a base for stating the 
discount rate: a so-called ‘gilts plus’ approach. This has been entrenched by the regulator, 
who presents rates in the form of margins over gilts. Thus the structure of information 
privileges so-called derisking strategies in the way it promotes norms and highlights 
deviations.  
 
To sum up: ‘valuation risk’ is not the same as risk to pension payments. The valuation is 
a way of checking whether the accumulated pension fund is on track to be able to pay the 
promised pensions, but it is just a check, and it is highly sensitive to the assumptions used 
to inform asset valuation, the selection of a discount rate, and the modelling of risk. Asset 
price volatility and changes in interest rates driving liability discount rates generate 
valuation risk and make it attractive to adopt an investment strategy which matches assets 
to the method for calculating liabilities. 
 
The Minimum Funding Requirement and the Myners Review 
The possibility that valuation practices could drive investment strategies in a 
counterproductive way became apparent in the early 2000s. The 1995 Pensions Act had 
introduced a Minimum Funding Requirement (MFR), effectively a valuation method. The 
MFR prescribed the discount rates that should be used to calculate the present value of 
the scheme’s liabilities. For pensions in payment, the prescribed discount rate was the 
rate of return on gilts, while the return on equities was used to discount liabilities for 
scheme members far from retirement, and a blend of the two for those within ten years of 
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retirement. It was not required that funds follow this pattern in their investment strategy, 
but any ‘mismatch’ brought valuation risk. Schemes with a substantial surplus of assets 
over liabilities on the MFR test or a strong sponsoring employer could afford to 
mismatch, and many schemes were in this position in the mid-1990s. After the dot.com 
crash of 2000, however, these surpluses disappeared, and there was a pronounced move 
to matching. In effect, the MFR-based calculation of the present value of liabilities 
became the liability which investment managers sought to match, rather than the pension 
income promised by schemes. 
 
In 2000, the Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, asked the chief 
executive of the investment management company Gartmore, Paul Myners, to conduct a 
review of institutional investment in the UK, with a remit to consider specifically whether 
there were distortions in investment decision-making. Myners’ main conclusion was that 
investment management was vulnerable to short-termism to meet the competitive 
demands of the fund manager ‘beauty parade’ identified long ago by Keynes. His 
recommendations amounted to a sustained attempt to promote more patient investment by 
UK pension funds. Features of patient investment include, inter alia, avoiding short time 
horizons for benchmarking investment performance, and actively engaging with 
corporate governance instead of buying and selling shares in response to corporate 
reporting (Deeg and Hardie 2016).  These ideas were incorporated into the so-called 
Myners Principles, which defined benefit pension schemes are required to sign up to. But 
the principles have remained voluntary and advisory, and have also been watered down 
over time. Myners wanted the principle of shareholder activism to be included in 
legislation, but this was not done. The anti-short-termism principle was ‘clarified’ in a 
2004 review to state simply that there should be clear horizons, with no reference to 
premature termination, or even to the expected duration of those horizons (HM Treasury 
2004, 3.38).  
 
Nowhere was the ineffectiveness of Myners’ recommendations clearer than in the 
evolution of practices over pension fund valuation. Myners argued that there were 
specific distortions arising from the effect of the MFR on institutional investment. He 
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proposed that government regulation should avoid prescribing the discount rate in 
pension valuations, because that induced fund managers to match the assets used to 
generate the discount rate for the liabilities (Myners 2001: 3.47). Instead there should be 
a ‘scheme specific funding requirement’ which allowed actuaries to choose their own 
discount rate, linked to the scheme trustees’ choice of investment strategy. This 
recommendation was accepted by the government and incorporated in legislation in the 
2004 Pensions Act, but it has proved not to have the effect that Myners intended. 
 
Myners’ second principle, ‘clear objectives’, proposed that the objectives of the 
investment strategy should be determined by the scheme’s liabilities, rather than 
matching a market index or achieving benchmarks based on the performance of other 
funds. In the context of the review, it was clear that the point of this edict was to combat 
short-termism: scheme liabilities (promised pensions) were often far into the future, 
implying that a far-sighted investment strategy could be adopted. But the time profile of 
liabilities varied, so the exact strategy would be scheme-specific.   
 
Myners’ analysis was based on the well-established idea of  Asset-Liability Matching 
(ALM), also termed liability-driven investment. An ALM study is concerned with 
working out the horizons of investors, and deriving a strategy accordingly. The idea that a 
fund’s investment strategy for its assets should match the nature of its liabilities has been 
part of investment practice for a long time. Indeed, one of the reasons that actuaries 
advocated equity investment in the 1950s was that equities were seen as a good long-term 
match for real liabilities, such as those of a DB scheme with inflation-protected pension 
promises (Goobey 2005). Bauer et al (2006) suggest that the development of more 
precise applications of the principles of ALM can be traced to contributions to the 
financial economics literature in the late 1960s which showed that the optimal portfolio 
choice of long-term investors differed from that of short-term investors.  
 
Applied to a DB scheme, ALM implies that schemes with increasing numbers of 
pensioner members relative to contributors should shift into less volatile assets. But the 
aging of scheme memberships does not explain the derisking that has occurred in the UK. 
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ALM studies by Bauer et al (2006) and Blake (2003), who used a model specifically 
calibrated on UK pension funds, rejected the possibility that DB fund liabilities were best 
matched by holding gilts. Something else had to explain why UK pension funds were 
sacrificing returns by moving into safer (less volatile) assets. 
 
The short explanation of why ALM has become associated with derisking is that pension 
fund trustees and their advisors match the valuation liability – the present value of 
liabilities – rather than the stream of future liabilities. This is because they are forced to 
focus on ‘valuation risk’, rather than risks to the flow of pension payments. A focus on 
valuation risk means, in effect, shortening the time horizon of the scheme. Far from 
weathering the storms of financial market volatility, such volatility generates valuation 
risk that must be managed. It follows that an ALM strategy which is focused on 
managing valuation risk will have a short-term orientation. 
 
Trustees are forced to focus on valuation risk for two main reasons. First, if they take 
valuation risk then, sooner or later, a triennial valuation will indicate that the scheme is 
underfunded, Since the regulator is generally reluctant to allow smoothing and tends to 
insist on short recovery periods, an adverse valuation has real consequences for 
sponsoring employers, who will have to increase their contributions, albeit only 
temporarily. Second, the possibility that employers will be called upon to repair the fund 
is incorporated into an anticipatory procedure where the employer’s capacity to repair is 
checked: this is the assessment of covenant. Estimates of reliance on the covenant are 
made by modeling the variance of returns. Even if there is substantial ‘mean reversion’ in 
the performance of volatile assets, model-generated episodes of poor returns can lead to 
the verdict that the scheme is taking too much risk. 
 
For its critics, starting with Myners, valuation risk is not a real risk, but a risk generated 
by regulatory calculations. But by the time of the second review of the Myners principles, 
in 2008, managing valuation risk had become a central task of trustees. The principle that 
the investment strategy should reflect the scheme’s liabilities had been recast into ‘taking 
into account the risks associated with their liabilities valuation’, notably ‘the strength of 
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the sponsor covenant [and] the risk of sponsor default’ (HM Treasury et al 2008, p.20). 
The principle was mapped onto TPR’s code of practice No 3 on Funding Defined 
Benefits, which places valuation risk front and center. Trustees are exhorted to 
‘understand and quantify the liability valuation risks you are running’ and to consider 
mitigating those risks ‘by investing in assets that move in a similar way to the value 
placed on the liabilities as market conditions change’ (TPR 2019: 53). 
 
A change of government in 2010 brought into office the Liberal Democrat Business 
Secretary, Vince Cable, a long-standing critic of the performance of the UK’s financial 
sector. He commissioned the academic and journalist John Kay to do another review, 
focused on short-termism in equity markets. Kay organized his review in the familiar 
consultative fashion of these endeavors in the UK, appointing an advisory group 
consisting of an industrialist, a pensions professional and an asset management executive. 
He also arranged a number of roundtable events, at which the Bank of England’s Andrew 
Haldane was a notable participant (Clark 2013). The outcome was a wide-ranging 
critique of current practices. Of particular relevance to pension scheme valuation were 
Kay’s comments on mark-to-market accounting, especially as it affected the reporting of 
pension fund deficits or surpluses on corporate balance sheets. He noted that ‘[c]hanges 
in bond yields may have large effects on the valuation of assets and liabilities even if the 
anticipated cash flows remain the same.’ (Kay 2012a: 22). Marked to market information 
about assets and liabilities which are not going to be realized was arguably ‘useless or 
misleading’, yet ‘even if directors, shareholders and investment intermediaries attempt to 
disregard information they perceive as having little or no value, they may be unable to do 
so.’ (Kay 2012a: 23) This is because TPR requires corporate sponsors to put in place 
deficit recovery plans if valuations show a deficit, which ‘means that the information 
contained in regular mark to market assessments is material whether or not the company 
believes it is relevant.’ 
 
Marking to market or fair value accounting provides a good illustration of the problem 
that Kay faced in formulating recommendations that might change practices. It was not 
possible to reverse decisions on the adoption of fair value, which had been taken in other 
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venues. The decisions of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) had been 
quickly translated into UK standards by the Accounting Standards Board (ASB), which 
was allowed considerable autonomy to ‘self-regulate’ by the government. The relevant 
international standard for calculating pension liabilities in company accounts, IAS19, was 
translated into Financial Reporting Standard 17 (FRS17) for implementation from 2005.  
Actuaries and other pension professionals recognized the stress that FRS17 would put on 
occupational pensions, but the relevant decisions were not made by those involved in 
regulating pensions, but by the ASB. Some employers with occupational pensions and 
unions seeking to defend members’ benefits protested against the new standard, but they 
had no institutional foothold in the relevant decision-making space (Bridgen and Meyer 
2009). 
 
Yet another critique of contemporary patterns of institutional investment came from the 
Bank of England. Andrew Haldane, Executive Director for Financial Stability at the time, 
convened a ‘Procyclicality Working Group’ (PCWG), comprising academics, pension 
professionals and other luminaries of the investment world (PCWG 2014, p.3). Its report 
also took aim at some of the canons of financial theory. In particular, it challenged the 
understanding of risk as volatility. ‘There also appears to have been a transition towards 
defining risk in terms of volatility.. However volatility is not necessarily a good indicator 
of risk..’ (PCWG 2014: 20) It followed that so-called derisking does not really reduce 
risk. ‘This process of shifting portfolio holdings from equities to fixed income, including 
index-linked instruments, is commonly referred to as “de-risking”. Although the shift 
does reduce market risk, it effectively ‘locks-in’ current market rates, which particularly 
in the current low-rates environment, can be costly.’ (PCWG 2014: 38) This cost brings 
other risks: notably the risk that pension promises cannot be fulfilled without increases in 
contributions.  
 
Research for the report found some signs of procyclicality in private sector DB pension 
schemes, whereas local authority pension funds, which are taxpayer-backed and therefore 
not subject to the same rules about assessing valuation risk in the light of the employer 
covenant, had pursued a countercyclical strategy (PCWG 2014: 5, 39). More generally, 
 24 
the report conveyed a belief among Bank economists that financial stability called for 
diversity in investor behavior, with long-term institutional investors well-placed to follow 
different principles to those guiding banks and hedge funds. This section has argued that 
a focus on valuation risk prevented this: it meant compressing the long-term into the 
short-term, and responding to the same signals and parameters as other market actors. But 
the critics seemed unable to develop their critiques into policies that would change 
pension fund behavior, even though they were well-placed in official circles. Myners’ 
recommendation of a scheme-specific funding requirement was a clear attempt to 
promote diversity and had found its way onto the statute book, but subsequent regulatory 
and self-regulatory practices had undermined its intended effects.   
 
 
5. The political embrace of financialized thinking 
 
This section examines the political response to a campaign led by the National 
Association of Pension Funds (NAPF, now the Pension and Lifetime Savings 
Association, PLSA)  in 2012-14 to raise the discount rates used in valuations. The 
government was reluctant to intervene, and the explanation advanced here was that it 
broadly embraced the use of valuations to check the viability of schemes, and would not 
take actions that it feared would raise the risk of scheme failure. This political risk-
aversity casts doubt upon the assumption that more democratization of financial 
governance would bring about major changes in regulation and produce outcomes nearer 
to the public interest. 
 
In the period soon after the adoption of QE by the Bank of England, both the Bank and 
the pensions industry agreed that something needed to be done to mitigate its effect on 
defined benefit pension schemes. Initially, the Bank rejected the industry’s complaints 
that QE was damaging the sector, but eventually it came to accept that monetary policy 
could interact in a perverse way with pension scheme governance practices (Bank of 
England 2012). The pensions industry, led by NAPF, campaigned for special regulatory 
measures to be taken to counter the effects of QE. NAPF focused on the effect of low 
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interest rates on valuations, whereas the regulator sought to preserve the existing 
approach to valuations but allow more flexibility in recovery plans in response to difficult 
economic conditions. In NAPF’s view, it was important to tackle the valuation itself, to 
‘avoid the negotiations around recovery plans beginning from what might be described as 
a recklessly prudent starting point.’ (NAPF 2012: 1).  
 
NAPF evaluated two ways of mitigating the effect of low gilt yields on valuations: 
smoothing the discount rate applied and adding a temporary mark-up to the rate. 
Smoothing had disadvantages: it did not suit those funds which had hedged against 
changes in gilts rates, and it would mean that gilts no longer provided a good match for 
valuation risks. The Bank might have seen this as an advantage, but NAPF did not; it 
would undermine established investment practices. NAPF preferred a temporary markup: 
this would give trustees a clear ‘green light’ to adjust the valuation. It would be an 
explicitly political decision: a statement or direction from the Government, reflecting ‘the 
political judgement required to trade off the UK corporate growth agenda against the 
TPR’s objectives’ (NAPF 2012: 24). Although the judgment was political, there was an 
attempt to find a technical basis for the markup: it ‘would be within the range of the Bank 
of England’s estimates of the impact of Quantitative Easing on gilt yields’ (NAPF 2012: 
25).  
 
One of the paradoxes of the NAPF campaign was that the industry sought to preserve 
discretion in valuation while at the same time arguing that government intervention was 
needed. NAPF repeatedly endorsed the ‘flexibility’ of the scheme specific funding 
regime. But that flexibility implied that trustees could make their own decisions to adjust 
discount rates in the light of QE. To explain why trustees could not take appropriate steps 
themselves, NAPF (2012: 6-7) argued that they were ‘unlikely to feel comfortable taking 
a less conventional approach to agreeing discount rate assumptions given the guidance 
already issued by TPR’ even though this guidance has no statutory authority. Thus TPR 
was supposedly to blame, but TPR relies on normal industry practice to give force to its 
views. The situation can be understood as a collective action problem: if trustees could 
act in concert, they could raise the discount rate benchmarks and thereby all appear 
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‘normal’. But a single scheme using a higher rate would be suspect: it would have to 
prove that it had the strength to underpin the risks it was supposedly taking. 
 
The campaign by NAPF was quite explicitly an attempt by the industry to solve this 
problem by getting ‘a clear Government statement or direction, given [i.e. against] TPR’s 
current stance.’  (NAPF 2012 p.1)  The government did respond, but not as NAPF had 
asked. It declared itself ‘determined to ensure that defined benefit pensions regulation 
does not act as a brake on investment and growth.’ (HM Treasury 2012 p.44). But all that 
was offered was a consultation, in which smoothing was on the agenda but a markup not. 
An additional objective for the regulator requiring it to consider the affordability of 
deficit recovery plans for sponsoring employers was proposed, but not the stronger 
objective requested by NAPF, to promote good pension provision and to ensure the 
health and longevity of schemes (NAPF 2012 p.26). 
 
It is clear in the consultation document issued by the Department of Work and Pensions 
(DWP) that the Government had come under considerable pressure to overrule the 
Regulator in ‘informal discussions with a number of organisations and sponsoring 
employers over the summer of 2012’ (DWP 2013 p.11). However, it is equally clear that 
the government was quite determined to duck this pressure. For example, the consultation 
identified changes to corporate accounting  as a key factor: firms sought to reduce the 
effect of valuation volatility on balance sheets by reducing their allocation to equities, 
and the resulting lower returns then meant that an increase in contributions was required 
(DWP 2013 p.6). But the government claimed that nothing could be done about this: 
‘accounting standards are set independently by the Financial Reporting Council and not 
the Government and so are out of the scope of this document.’ (DWP 2013 p.11). More 
generally, the consultation emphasized that valuation involved the exercise of judgment 
by a number of professionally qualified parties, and the government would not interfere 
with their judgment. It would send a gentle signal to the regulator with the addition of a 
new statutory objective to ‘minimise any adverse impact on the sustainable growth of an 
employer’ (introduced in 2014), but that was all. 
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One explanation for the government’s caution is that it had learned a painful lesson from 
its experience of the MFR about the potential costs of close engagement with the process 
of certifying funds as balanced or in surplus. The MFR was widely understood as 
ensuring that pensions were secure, but it did not promise or achieve this. In 2004, the 
Parliamentary Ombudsman announced an enquiry into complaints made by about 100 
members and trustees of pension schemes, who claimed that the government had ignored 
evidence in failing to warn members of the risks to their schemes, and also had provided 
members and trustees with inaccurate information (Thurley 2008 p.13). In 2006, she 
brought down a finding of maladministration, based on the government’s failure to 
consider and balance relevant evidence, and rejecting the government’s defence that it 
had appropriately relied on the recommendations of the actuarial profession. The 
government rejected the Ombudsman’s findings, but subsequently the High Court 
quashed this rejection. The government was forced to compensate those affected. 
 
This episode illustrated sharply the government’s dilemma over securing pensions while 
also promoting productive risk-taking. Tightening regulatory requirements would 
increase the cost of schemes to employers, hastening their closure. But failure to regulate 
tightly exposed the government to claims for compensation. The scheme specific funding 
requirement was meant to address this dilemma by delegating the judgment of adequacy 
to trustees, advised by actuaries. If schemes failed, this would be down to failures by 
trustees, rather than maladministration by the government. 
 
The government also sought to limit its exposure to pension compensation claims by 
establishing the Pension Protection Fund (PPF). Broadly, the PPF protected pensions in 
payment, while only partially honoring the accrued rights of members who had not yet 
retired. The element of risk-sharing - the loss borne by active members if their scheme 
failed – was consistent with a self-regulatory system in which trustees (acting on behalf 
of members) would have an incentive to monitor the scheme and prevent employers 
getting away with underfunding. But technical analysis of the insurance provided by the 
PPF suggested that this incentive would sometimes be insufficient. There was potential 
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‘moral hazard’, and regulation would be necessary to control claims on the fund 
(McCarthy and Neuberger 2005).   
 
Protecting the PPF was one of the regulator’s statutory objectives. Arguably, it assumed 
too much significance. But TPR was politically pressured to pay attention to the PPF. 
Scheme failures have resulted in political outcries in which the regulator is blamed for 
not taking prior action against the sponsoring employer. For example, the failure of the 
outsourcing company Carillion in 2017 was followed by a scathing parliamentary report, 
and the then-CEO of TPR announced soon afterwards that she would not be seeking 
renewal of her contract. The Work and Pensions Committee of Parliament developed a 
practice of taking a close interest in the valuation outcomes of occupational pension 
schemes. The Committee’s website lists extensive correspondence with scheme trustees 
and the regulator. Its close interest reflects the political salience of the issues. When 
schemes fail, ordinary people are seen as falling victim to the machinations of corporate 
capitalism. Pension scheme failures provided an opportunity for a much wider attack on 
corporate greed. The Committee focused particularly on the ways in which equity could 
be extracted from companies, not only by excessive dividends but also through executive 
pay and consultancy fees. The main effect of political engagement is to put pressure on 
the regulator to be tougher and intervene more in the running of schemes. In 2018, the 
government announced plans for a new Pensions Act which would increase the powers of 
the regulator. 
 
This section has traced a failed attempt to get the government to engage in pension 
scheme governance to override the precautionary orientation of the regulator. The 
diagnosis offered here is that it suited the government to delegate to trustees and the 
regulator, even if the resulting policy was not ideal. Depoliticization was eminently 
political: there was a blame-avoiding calculation that engagement was not worth the risk 
of being held responsible if schemes failed. Living with risk was unattractive to the 





This paper has sought to move beyond the simple and appealing story of the financial 
crisis and its aftermath, of a powerful financial sector overrunning supine governments 
and captured regulators. The approach adopted here challenges the frame of ‘politics 
versus finance’ by acknowledging the risk-return dilemma facing public authorities. State 
actors have a central role in constituting financial markets. They reap rewards from 
financial risk-taking, while also being exposed to contingent liabilities when adverse 
outcomes materialize. 
 
The regulation of collective pension schemes brings a dilemma into sharp focus. If 
financial risk-taking is to be managed for social ends, it is necessary to have collective 
institutions so that individuals can benefit from risk pooling. But collective institutions 
bring politics - the politics of preventing or mitigating failure – and the government is 
roped in as guarantor of last resort. One way for governments to escape this fate is to 
allow collective institutions to be destroyed, and instead encourage individual risk-
bearing. In the pensions area, this means promoting individual DC funds. Aside from the 
social costs of not pooling risk, this potentially has damaging cyclical and structural 
effects in financial markets. Thus it is important to sustain collective risk pooling in 
vehicles like occupational pension funds. But many UK pension funds have adopted low-
return investment strategies which are likely to hasten their closure.  
 
This paper has sought to identify the reasons why. It has shown that schemes are run 
according to practices constructed and maintained by financial intermediaries in dialogue 
with the regulator. Principles-based regulation enables the industry to develop solutions 
to public policy problems, in the expectation that these solutions will be more efficient 
than imposed measures. But this mode of regulation creates strong pressures to converge 
on common models and practices, and this in turn engenders herding which undermines 
the supposed advantages of competitive market-based provision. 
 
The industry has embraced financial models: the solution to problems is found in 
calculations. As Gelepithis (2019) emphasized, this gives a significant role to asset 
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managers and other investment intermediaries in determining outcomes. They see 
themselves as neutral professionals, and indeed they have no obvious interest in the 
adoption of one model over another. They do, however, have an interest in advocating 
technical solutions which they can implement. Their interaction with the regulator seems 
to create an impenetrable structure of governance, whereby even expert critics like those 
at the Bank of England have not been able to find a foothold for their views.  
 
The data presented in section 3 suggest that derisking in the UK is more endemic than in 
other comparable pension systems. At first sight, it is surprising that a system with no 
quantitative rules and substantial elements of trustee and actuarial discretion has 
produced this bias towards precautionary behavior. While this article cannot offer a 
systematic comparison, notable features of the UK case include the weak representation 
of member interests in scheme governance, along with an assumption that employers who 
favor ‘rewarded risk’ investment strategies are exhibiting moral hazard. The structure of 
governance is such that those who have a clear interest in outcomes are sidelined, and 
technical calculations are relied upon.  
 
This article has argued that ‘politicization’ in the sense of more government involvement 
does not offer a remedy to the dysfunctional effects of financialized governance on 
pension funds, as governments also embrace precautionary calculations. Regulatory 
entanglement with financialized risk management is not helped by a political 
environment which is intolerant of uncertainty and inclined to treat scheme failures as 
disasters and scandals. Political pressure on the regulator instead produces even more 
insistence on finding authoritative common standards. This authority is yielded to 
intermediaries whose performance of financial economic theory is seen as neutral and 
impartial. On present trends, these practices will lead to the destruction of collective risk-
sharing in occupational pensions and its replacement with individualized arrangements 
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